BS ISO 26262-10:2012
$215.11
Road vehicles. Functional safety – Guideline on ISO 26262
| Published By | Publication Date | Number of Pages |
| BSI | 2012 | 100 |
PDF Catalog
| PDF Pages | PDF Title |
|---|---|
| 9 | Scope Normative references |
| 10 | Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms Key concepts of ISO 26262 Functional safety for automotive systems (relationship with |
| 12 | Item, system, element, component, hardware part and software |
| 13 | Relationship between faults, errors and failures |
| 14 | Selected topics regarding safety management Work product Confirmation measures General |
| 15 | Functional safety assessment |
| 17 | Understanding of safety cases Interpretation of safety cases |
| 18 | Safety case development lifecycle Concept phase and system development General Example of hazard analysis and risk assessment General |
| 19 | Analysis 1 Analysis 2 An observation regarding controllability classification |
| 20 | External measures General Example of vehicle-dependent external measures 1 Example of vehicle-dependent external measures 2 |
| 21 | Example of combining safety goals Introduction General Function definition Safety goals applying to the same hazard in different situat Hazard analysis and risk assessment |
| 22 | Safety goals elaboration Safety process requirement structure – Flow and sequence of |
| 25 | Concerning hardware development The classification of random hardware faults General Single-point fault Residual fault |
| 26 | Detected dual-point fault Perceived dual-point fault Latent dual-point fault |
| 27 | Safe fault Flow diagram for fault classification and fault class contri |
| 30 | How to consider the failure rate of multiple-point faults re Example of residual failure rate and local single-point faul General |
| 31 | Technical safety requirement for sensor A_Master |
| 32 | Description of the safety mechanism |
| 35 | Evaluation of example 1 described in Figure 11 General |
| 37 | Case 1: Sensor stuck-at value m > m2 fault |
| 38 | Case 2: Sensor stuck-at value m < m1 fault |
| 39 | Case 3: Sensor stuck-at value m ∈ [m1, m2] fault |
| 42 | Final residual failure rate assessment Improvement of SPFMSensor Further explanation concerning hardware How to deal with microcontrollers in the context of ISO 2626 |
| 43 | Safety analysis methods Consideration of exposure duration in the calculation of Pro |
| 44 | Safety element out of context Safety element out of context development |
| 45 | Use cases General |
| 46 | Development of a system as a safety element out of context |
| 47 | Step 1a – Definition of the scope of SEooC |
| 48 | Step 1b – Assumptions on safety requirements for the SEooC Step 2 – Development of the SEooC Step 3 – Work products Step 4 – Integration of the SEooC into the item Development of a hardware component as a safety element out General |
| 49 | Step 1 – Assumptions on system level Step 1a – Assumptions on technical safety requirements |
| 50 | Step 1b – Assumptions on system-level design Step 2 – Execution of hardware development Step 3 – Work products Step 4 – Integration of the SEooC into the item |
| 52 | Development of a software component as a safety element out General Step 1a – Assumptions on the scope of the software component |
| 53 | Step 1b – Assumptions on the safety requirements of the soft Step 2 – Development of the software component Step 3 – Integration of the software component in a new part An example of proven in use argument General |
| 54 | Item definition and definition of the proven in use candidat Change analysis Target values for proven in use |
| 55 | Concerning ASIL decomposition Objective of ASIL decomposition Description of ASIL decomposition An example of ASIL decomposition General Item definition |
| 56 | Hazard analysis and risk assessment Associated safety goal Preliminary architecture and safety concept General Purpose of the elements (initial architecture) Functional safety concept General |
| 57 | Evolved safety concept of the item |
