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BSI PAS 69:2006

$17.13

Guidelines for the specification and installation of vehicle security barriers

Published By Publication Date Number of Pages
BSI 2006 30
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PDF Pages PDF Title
3 Contents
Introduction iv
1 Scope 1
2 Terms and definitions 1
3 Site assessment 1
4 Choice of barrier 5
5 Installation of vehicle security barriers 8
Annexes
Annex A (informative) Selection of barriers – Decision process 10
Annex B (informative) Considerations for barrier selection 11
Annex C (informative) Fixed bollards 15
Annex D (informative) Rising bollards 16
Annex E (informative) Road blockers 17
Annex F (informative) Drop-arm barriers 18
Annex G (informative) Sliding gate barriers 19
Annex H (informative) Planters 21
Bibliography 23
5 Foreword
6 Introduction
7 1 Scope
2 Terms and definitions
2.1 operational requirement
2.2 traffic management
2.3 traffic calming
2.4 standoff
2.5 vehicle airlock system
3 Site assessment
3.1 Identify and quantify the threat
a) whether it is parked outside or inside the security perimeter;
b) whether it is driven towards a security perimeter;
c) whether an explosive device is carried;
d) the potential size of vehicle (both largest and smallest);
e) whether it is articulated or rigid;
f) its corresponding height, width, weight and possible cargo.
8 3.2 Identify the critical assets
3.3 Consider collateral damage
a) areas where there are high concentrations of people;
b) underground tunnels, basements and subways;
c) vent shafts;
d) bridges;
e) major communication networks (above and below ground);
f) electricity, water and gas lines (above and below ground);
g) control rooms.
3.4 Consider the requirements for security measures
9 a) Whether the security need will be met if a single line of active barriers/bollards is provided to form a continuous perimeter.
b) Whether an airlock system should be considered in order to form an effective access control system.
3.5 Survey the site
3.6 Identify stakeholders
10 3.7 Survey traffic
3.8 Plan traffic management methodologies and solutions
a) Is it possible to limit traffic to one entry and one exit point?
b) Should the entry and exit points be in different locations?
c) Is a vehicle holding and searching area needed?
d) Where would waiting vehicles be held?
e) Could waiting vehicles be vulnerable to attack?
f) What arrangements are needed for vehicles that will not be permitted entry? For example, are reject gaps or lanes required?
g) What are the proposed access control measures and how might they be compromised?
h) Will traffic calming measures be needed?
i) What warning signs/lights will be needed to indicate the presence and status of the vehicle security barrier?
j) How much space is needed between warning signs and the barriers?
k) Is sufficient reaction time available for the operation of the barrier?
11 l) How is “tailgating” to be addressed? Are vehicle airlock systems required?
m) Where possible, pedestrian and vehicular traffic should be separated, and pedestrian crossing points should be kept away from traffic control barriers.
n) Consider alternative arrangements for maintenance periods or equipment failure.
3.9 Review of security arrangements
4 Choice of barrier
4.1 Access control
a) manual – push button control by guard for all movements;
b) semi automatic – opening by guard, closing automatically via detection loops or similar;
c) fully automatic – opening by an access control, closing automatically via detection loops or similar;
d) prevention of “tailgating” by quick acting barriers or by a second set of barriers located further in the site;
e) remote control override with emergency close/reset;
f) barrier working with other equipment – lifting arm barriers/gates;
g) ease of operation for staff;
h) security of control unit.
12 4.2 Barrier performance
a) impact – the mass and velocity of the vehicle type that the vehicle security barrier can successfully restrain in an impact test;
b) penetration – the distance that the vehicle will penetrate beyond the vehicle security barrier;
c) dispersion – the distance over which major debris from the vehicle will be dispersed.
4.3 Factors affecting the vehicle security barrier selection
a) the alternative directions of approach available to a threat vehicle. Routes could be used which conflict with the “rules of the road”;
b) whether or not the site can accept the size of the foundations required for the selected design of tested barrier;
c) the space available outside the perimeter for the barrier to be installed;
d) the need for traffic calming to reduce the approach speed of threat vehicles;
e) the need for resilience to slow speed or accidental strikes.
4.4 Penetration/clearance
13 4.5 Dispersion
4.6 Speed of operation
4.7 Power requirement
a) How will the power failure be indicated?
b) Will there be an uninterrupted power supply?
c) Will manual operation be required?
d) How much time will be needed to restore the security of the perimeter?
e) What position is the barrier left in, in the event of a power failure?
4.8 Environmental considerations
a) drainage, whether the system needs a drainage system for water run off or high water table;
b) sediment, leaf mould, and rubbish which could accumulate and restrict operation;
c) the temperature range for which the barrier is rated;
d) sea air, industrial pollutants and animal debris;
e) windswept debris;
f) ice.
14 4.9 Other considerations for vehicle security barriers
a) planned and emergency maintenance of the barrier on access in and out of the site;
b) adverse effects on existing security systems;
c) surface water drainage;
d) road user sightlines;
e) sightlines from guardhouse to the decision point and the barrier;
f) safety of pedestrians, vehicle users and cyclists;
g) lighting requirements for identifying barriers and minimizing shadows;
h) training guidance;
i) traffic management (e.g. external and internal);
j) emergency evacuation plan;
k) emergency services plans, including communication between other points of entry and exit to the asset.
5 Installation of vehicle security barriers
5.1 General
5.2 Foundations
16 Annex A (informative) Selection of barriers – Decision process
17 Annex B (informative) Considerations for barrier selection
B.1 Stopping ability
B.1.1 Angle of attack
B.1.2 Vehicle type
B.1.3 Kinetic energy
B.1.4 Test reliability
18 B.2 Barrier integrity
B.2.1 Encroachment/deflection
B.2.2 Barrier damage on impact
B.2.3 Repair time
B.2.4 Multi-vehicle attacks
B.2.5 Effects of blast and fragmentation on barriers
B.3 Availability, quality and cost
B.3.1 Availability of units
19 B.3.2 Quality of units
B.3.3 Unit cost
B.4 Procurement
B.5 Durability
B.6 Appearance
B.6.1 Aesthetics
B.6.2 Conspicuity
B.6.3 Deterrence
B.7 Deployment planning
B.7.1 Highway authority approval
20 B.7.2 Removal considerations
B.8 Logistics of deployment
B.8.1 Disruption and timings
B.8.2 Staff skills and availability
B.9 Construction on site
B.9.1 Setting out
B.9.2 Lifting and placement issues
B.10 Civil works
B.10.1 Ground types
B.10.2 Foundations
21 B.10.3 Reliance on friction
Annex C (informative) Fixed bollards
C.1 General
C.2 Foundations
C.3 Layout
a) provide gaps where pedestrian movement is appropriate to accommodate the relevant requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 1995 [1];
b) restrict the width of gap so that normal sized cars, and especially goods vehicles, are prevented from passing between adjace…
22 Annex D (informative) Rising bollards
D.1 General
D.2 Foundations
D.3 Layout
a) provide gaps where pedestrian movement is appropriate, to accommodate the relevant requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 1995 [1];
b) restrict the width of gap so that normal sized cars, and especially goods vehicles, are prevented from passing between adjace…
23 D.4 Control system
a) a surface-mounted control system itself will require protection against vehicle or manual attack;
b) a panic button is required, if so, what function should it have;
c) in the event of a power failure, the system can still be operated, and how this will be achieved;
d) a service failure between the barrier control system and the control cabinet will compromise the level of security;
e) the barrier is required to be open or closed as its failsafe position;
f) the effect on the system will be catastrophic in a vehicle airlock system powered from a single source, if one of the elements is impacted.
Annex E (informative) Road blockers
E.1 General
E.2 Foundations
E.3 Spacing
a) restrict the width of gaps so that any vehicle is prevented from passing between adjacent blockers. A suggested maximum gap is 500 mm between the upright faces of successive Blockers;
b) restrict the width of gap on either side of the blocker. Ensure the perimeter is secure by reducing the gap by the use of static bollards or other robust street furniture.
24 E.4 Control System
a) a surface-mounted control system itself will require protection against vehicle or manual attack;
b) a panic button is required (if so, what should be its function?);
c) in the event of a power failure, the system can still be operated, and how this will be achieved;
d) a service failure between the barrier and the control cabinet will compromise the level of security;
e) the barrier is required to be open or closed as its failsafe position;
f) the effect on the system will be catastrophic in a vehicle airlock system powered from a single source, if one of the elements is impacted.
Annex F (informative) Drop-arm barriers
F.1 General
F.2 Foundations
25 F.3 Layout
a) the direction of traffic flow. The design of the latching mechanism for the receiving end of the arm drop arm may be direction sensitive;
b) when installing an airlock system, the spacing between the pair of drop arms should be sufficient to allow the largest antici…
c) the perimeter of any sterile area. It should be made secure by the installation of a barrier system at least as strong as the chosen drop-arm barriers.
F.4 Control System
a) a surface mounted itself will require protection against vehicle or manual attack;
b) a panic button is required (if so, what should be its function?);
c) in the event of a power failure, the system can still be operated, and how this will be achieved;
d) a service failure between the barrier and the control cabinet will compromise the level of security;
e) the barrier is required to be open or closed as its failsafe position;
f) the effect on the system will be catastrophic in a vehicle airlock system powered from a single source, if one of the elements is impacted.
Annex G (informative) Sliding gate barriers
G.1 General
G.2 Foundations
26 G.3 Layout
a) the direction of traffic flow. The design of the latching mechanism for the receiving end of the gate may be direction sensitive;
b) when installing an airlock system, the spacing between the pair of gates should be sufficient to allow the largest anticipate…
c) the perimeter of any sterile area. It should be made secure by the installation of a barrier system at least as strong as the chosen gates.
G.4 Control system
a) a surface-mounted control system itself will require protection against vehicle or manual attack;
b) a panic button is required (if so, what should be its function?);
c) in the event of a power failure, the system can still be operated, and how this will be achieved;
d) a service failure between the barrier and the control cabinet will compromise the level of security;
e) the barrier is required to be open or closed as its failsafe position;
f) the effect on the system will be catastrophic in a vehicle airlock system powered from a single source, if one of the elements is impacted.
27 Annex H (informative) Planters
H.1 General
a) Free-standing – the planter rests on the surface and its weight is supplemented only by the frictional resistance between the planter and the ground.
b) Pinned – the planter rests on the surface and is connected by pins or studs protruding from the planter into the ground. The pins are typically epoxied into position.
c) Rebated – the planter is set into a rebate dug into the surface.
d) Structural – engineered with integral foundations.
H.2 Foundations
H.2.1 General
a) nature of the ground soil, paving, asphalt/block work, concrete;
b) strength of the sub-grade;
c) bending strength and shear/bearing strength of the pins;
d) size, quantity and spacing of the pins;
e) length of engagement both in the planter and in the ground;
f) desired depth of rebate.
28 H.3 Layout
a) where pedestrian movement is appropriate, if spacing and positioning of planters is required to provide gaps to accommodate the relevant requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 1995 [1];
b) if positioning will maximize the opportunity for a number of units to interact if displaced following a vehicle impact;
c) if interaction is not achieved could a planter be sufficiently displaced to allow following hostile vehicles to penetrate the barrier line;
d) if interaction is not achieved, the planter could become part of the problem;
e) the height and layout of planters. Lines of sight could be adversely affected.
29 Bibliography
[1] GREAT BRITIAN. Disability Discrimination Act 1995. London: The Stationery Office.
BSI PAS 69:2006
$17.13